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Summary 
Multinational enterprises are private entities run on a voluntary basis; 
consequently they have only moral responsibilities to facilitate access to 
medicines under the right to health. As international human rights law 
stands today, there are no legal obligations for pharmaceutical companies to 
ensure, nor improve, the accessibility to medicines for developing countries; 
this is the obligation of states.  
 
It has been recognized that patents has a vital function in society, and while 
patents are important in all industries, they are practically indispensable in 
the pharmaceutical industry. After the implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement all WTO members, including developing countries, are obliged 
to grant pharmaceutical patents for a period of 20 years. It is undisputed that 
medical patents can, in some circumstances, create barriers to the 
accessibility of medicines for developing countries, however it is crucially 
important to recognize that patents are not the root cause of the problem. 
Access to medicines is impeded by obstacles far greater than medical 
patents, such as absolute poverty, corrupted governments, poorly educated 
doctors, nurses, pharmacists and so on. In addition, there is a blatant market 
failure being the lack of incentive for pharmaceutical companies to invest 
R&D into neglected diseases, which causes the deaths of millions of people 
worldwide every year. These diseases strike the poorest of the poor in rural 
and low- income areas of the world and less than 10% of global health 
research spending is dedicated to these diseases that afflict 90% of the 
world´s poorest population. 
 
Demands and pressure on pharmaceutical companies to denounce their IP 
rights has become a new trend, however it is far from a long-term solution. 
Instead, focus should be shifted to coping with the real villain, namely: the 
lack of incentive for pharmaceutical R&D for neglected diseases. There are 
many initiatives on the way for incentivizing the search for new drugs, 
including differential pricing strategies and the emergence of new and 
innovative partnerships, such as the public-private partnerships. The usage 
of patent pools and prize funds are also an alternative to the unsatisfying 
market-driven R&D system of today.  
 
As long as there is no legally binding treaty on the subject of pharmaceutical 
corporate responsibility in relation to access to medicines, it is important to 
turn to voluntary measures in order to influence the behavior of 
pharmaceutical companies. The extent of CSR remains unsettled, however, 
thanks to the guidelines framed by the UN Special Representative on 
Business and Human Rights: John Ruggie, and of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health: Paul Hunt, some precision has been 
achieved in recent years. The guidelines provide a normative foundation 
upon which a more comprehensive set of binding legal obligations could be 
built in the future.   
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Sammanfattning 
 
Multinationella företag är privata enheter som drivs på frivillig basis, varför 
de endast har ett moraliskt ansvar för att underlätta tillgången till läkemedel 
inom ramen för rätten till hälsa. Såsom internationell lagstiftning om 
mänskliga rättigheter står skriven idag, finns det inga rättsliga förpliktelser 
för läkemedelsföretagen att säkerställa eller förbättra tillgängligheten till 
läkemedel för utvecklingsländerna, detta är en skyldighet som tillfaller 
stater. 
 
Patent uppfyller en viktig funktion i samhället och medan patent är viktigt i 
alla branscher är de praktiskt taget oumbärliga inom läkemedelsindustrin. 
Efter genomförandet av TRIPS-avtalet är alla WTO-medlemmar, inklusive 
utvecklingsländer, skyldiga att bevilja läkemedelspatent för en period av 20 
år. Det är ostridigt att medicinska patent kan, under vissa omständigheter, 
skapa hinder för tillgången till läkemedel för utvecklingsländer, dock är det 
av grundläggande vikt att inse att patent inte är den fundamentala orsaken 
till problemet. Tillgången till läkemedel hämmas av hinder mycket större än 
medicinska patent, såsom absolut fattigdom, korrupta regeringar, dåligt 
utbildade läkare, sjuksköterskor, farmaceuter o.s.v. Dessutom finns det ett 
uppenbart ”market failure”(= marknadsmisslyckande) nämligen bristen på 
incitament för läkemedelsföretagen att satsa FoU i s.k. försummade 
sjukdomar, vilket leder till att miljontals människor över hela världen dör 
varje år. Dessa sjukdomar drabbar de fattigaste av de fattiga på landsbygden 
och i låginkomstområden i världen och mindre än 10% av de globala 
hälsoforskningsutgifterna är tillägnad dessa sjukdomar som drabbar 90% av 
världens fattigaste befolkning. 
 
Att ställa krav på läkemedelsföretagen att förkasta sina immateriella 
rättigheter har blivit en trend, men det är långt ifrån en långsiktig lösning. 
Istället bör fokus skiftas till att handskas med den verkliga boven, nämligen 
bristen på incitament för farmaceutisk FoU för försummade sjukdomar. Det 
finns många nya initiativ på väg för att skapa just detta incitament för 
sökandet efter nya läkemedel, såsom strategier för differentierad prissättning 
och framväxten av nya och innovativa partnerskap, såsom offentlig-privata 
partnerskap. Användningen av patentpooler och prisfonder är också ett 
alternativ till det otillfredsställande marknadsdrivna FoU-systemet som 
existerar idag. 
 
Då det inte finns något rättsligt bindande fördrag för läkemedelsföretagens 
ansvar när det gäller tillgång till läkemedel, är det viktigt att vända sig till 
mer frivilliga åtgärder för att kunna påverka läkemedelsföretags beteende. 
Omfattningen av CSR är fortfarande oviss, dock har viss klarhet bringats i 
ämnet de senaste åren tack vare de riktlinjer som har framställts av FN:s 
särskilda representant för företag och mänskliga rättigheter: John Ruggie, 
och av FN:s särskilda rapportör om rätten till hälsa: Paul Hunt. Riktlinjerna 
tillhandahåller en normativ grund för att i framtiden kunna skapa en 
omfattande uppsättning av bindande rättsliga skyldigheter. 
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Abbreviations 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
ARV Antiretroviral (drugs) 
CESCR UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights  
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
EU European Union 
FN Förenta Nationerna 
FoU Forskning och utveckling 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economical, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IP Intellectual Property 
MNE Multinational Enterprises 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
PPP Public- Private Partnerships 
R&D Research and Development 
TRIPS The agreement on Trade-Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
UDHR United Nations Declaration on Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
UNDEP United Nations Development Programme 
WHO World Health Organization                                                                           
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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1. Introduction  
 
“Expensive medicines are always 
good: if not for the patient, at least 
for the druggist."1 
 
One of the most promising areas of modern science is the area of medicine. 
Modern medicines have reduced the deadly threat of many diseases such as 
malaria, tuberculosis and have lessened the impact of diseases such as 
AIDS. But are all people receiving the benefits? For several decades the 
lack of essential medicines has burdened developing countries worldwide 
and WHO studies has shown that approximately 14 million people per year 
die from infectious diseases, 90% of whom live in a developing country. 
Furthermore, children and very young adults in Africa and Southeast Asia 
bear a heavier burden in relation to infectious diseases and 50% of all deaths 
are attributable to six diseases, namely: HIV/AIDS, acute respiratory 
syndrome, diarrheal diseases, malaria, measles and tuberculosis.2The real 
tragedy is that most of these diseases are preventable, treatable or even 
curable with existing medications. However, these diseases are referred to as 
“neglected diseases” since they almost exclusively affect populations with 
little purchasing power, meaning that they offer an insufficient incentive for 
industry to invest in R&D, causing essential medicines to remain 
unavailable for the poor. It is simply not profitable for most pharmaceutical 
companies to develop new medicines or lower the cost of already existing 
drugs for people living in developing countries. But should they have to? Is 
it really the pharmaceutical industry´s responsibility to ensure the realization 
of access to medicines under the right to health? 
 
Pharmaceutical companies, through their patents, have for a long time been 
accused of creating barriers to access to medicines and being the root cause 
of the egregious deaths of millions of people. After the implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement, this accusation gained more fuel. However, barriers 
to access to medicines are caused by numerous reasons, such as poverty, 
market failure, unfair trade practice and weak governance. The market 
failure referred to is the one associated with medical patents and the lack of 
incentive to invest R&D into neglected diseases. Lately, too much focus has 
been placed on blaming the pharmaceutical industry for their patent schemes 
and not enough focus has been placed on the much more acute problem of 
lack of incentive.  
 
Pharmaceutical companies are private economical entities driven by profit 
maximization, and in order for them to invest time and money there must be 
a prospect of recouping their investment. The existing rules for 
                                                
1 Russian Proverb 
2 Wu, Chuan- Feng, Transnational Pharmaceutical corporations´ legal and moral human 
rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines, Asian Journal of WTO and 
International Health Law and Policy (2012) p. 77 
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incentivizing3 pharmaceutical research are morally problematic since they 
treat health as a mere commodity on the market. But instead of placing the 
blame on private entities, new and innovative methods that incentivize the 
search for new drugs must be encouraged in order to overcome this market 
failure and the question is; how can this incentive be created? If there are no 
legal obligations for pharmaceutical companies in regards to access to 
medicines, what is the role of voluntary measures then? Is it possible for 
soft law and CSR to influence the behavior of pharmaceutical companies for 
the better?  
 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is first to highlight the market failure caused by 
the lack of incentives for pharmaceutical R&D for neglected diseases, and 
second to present a set of measures and solutions that can overcome this 
market failure. The aim here is to show why it is necessary to re-shift focus 
into combatting the market failure associated with the lack of incentive for 
pharmaceutical companies to invest R&D into neglected diseases, instead of 
focusing blindly at the adverse effects of medical patents and blaming the 
pharmaceutical industry. The latter will not solve the market failure, while 
focusing on different measures that incentivize the search for new drugs can 
potentially save the lives of millions of people living in the poorest areas of 
the world.   
 
In order to achieve this purpose, it is first necessary to outline the exact 
obligations that pharmaceutical companies have in relation to access to 
medicines, if there exists any legal obligations to ensure access to medicines 
or whether there only exists moral obligations. Entering the field of moral 
obligations, the thesis will further present voluntary mechanisms such as 
soft law and guidelines dedicated to the matter, as well as dealing with the 
related issue of CSR. The aim here is to present a portfolio of good practice 
that, if adopted by pharmaceutical companies, could potentially improve 
access to medicines. For the purpose, the general term “medicines” will 
refer broadly to drugs, vaccines, diagnostics and other medical products.  
 
Seeing that there is a much heated debate on the subject of medical patents 
and access to medicines, the goal is not to present a complete solution but 
instead to shed light on the different solutions and reform strategies, seen 
from a “lack- of- incentive” perspective instead of a “patent-is-bad” 
perspective. Focusing on the problem will not solve anything, but focusing 
on the solution might. 
 
The following questions are to be answered in order to fulfill the purpose: 
 
                                                
3 The term “incentivize/incentivizing” will be used for measures that enhance and motivate 
pharmaceutical R&D, ergo; measures that create incentives.  
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1. Is there any legal obligation under international human 
rights law for pharmaceutical companies to facilitate 
access to medicines under the right to health? 
 
2. How do medical patents affect access to medicines, and 
what have been the affects of the TRIPS Agreement? 
   
3. How can incentives be created to attract pharmaceutical 
companies into investing more R&D into neglected 
diseases?   
   
4. How can voluntary mechanisms, such as soft law and 
CSR, influence the business conduct of pharmaceutical 
companies? 
 
1.2 Method  
The starting point of the investigation will consist of a brief presentation of 
international human rights law, such as the UDHR and ICESCR, where the 
right to health encompassing access to medicine will be outlined. The 
question to be answered is whether there exist any legal obligations for 
pharmaceutical companies to ensure access to medicines. Secondly, there 
will be an overview of the TRIPS Agreement with focus on the flexibilities 
presented within, as well as an overview of the subsequent Doha 
Declaration, both frameworks being of crucial importance for 
pharmaceutical companies. Both initial chapters will be based upon the 
usage of a traditional legal dogmatic methodology in order to answer the 
quandaries at issue.  
 
Coming to the focal point of the thesis, there will be a presentation of 
different reform strategies and measures followed by a thorough analysis of 
how these methods are actually capable of incentivizing the search for new 
drugs. Furthermore, voluntary measures and the concept of CSR will be 
examined, in order to see how they can improve the business conduct of 
MNEs. Since the aim of this part of the thesis is not to interpret existing law, 
the usage of traditional legal dogmatic methodology will not be applied. 
Instead, the usage of a non-formal, law and economic methodology will be 
applied. The chosen methodology reflects in a better way the aim and 
purpose of the thesis, since the understanding of a market failure is crucial. 
Also, the solutions presented are stemming from an economical point of 
view, instead of merely setting out the positive state of law (de lege lata). 
The aim is to present alternative solutions and measures that can be as 
effective as hard-law, by collecting and analyzing different solutions and 
measures suggested by different scholars and authors. 
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1.3 Delimitations 
The scope of the thesis is fairly broad, seeing that the subject of patents and 
access to medicine has fueled much heated debates during the last decade. 
The thesis will however only deal with questions relating to patents and how 
they affect access to medicine for developing, other forms of IP rights are 
therefore excluded. The thesis will also not deal with questions relating to 
human rights in general, but focus only on those relating to the right to 
health and access to medicines.   
 
There exist several suggested measures and strategies for the enhancement 
of incentive for pharmaceutical R&D, however, this thesis will only deal 
with measures that are already being applied by some, measures that are 
believed to be most successful, and for the sake of “thinking-outside-the- 
box”: measures that require an entire reform and that therefore truly 
enlighten the endless possibilities.  
 
Regarding voluntary measures such as soft law, there have been made much 
needed delimitations, seeing that there are several guidelines and 
frameworks dedicated for the purpose of regulating MNEs business 
conduct. However, this thesis will only deal with guidelines that have been 
dedicated specifically for pharmaceutical companies, along with general 
framework that can be applied on pharmaceutical companies and have been 
endorsed by the international arena, such as the UN Global Compact and the 
Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework presented by the UN Special 
Representative John Ruggie.  
 
1.4 Literature 
The conflict and relation between medical patents and the right to health has 
been debated fiercely in legal literature, and even more so since the 
introduction of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994. Human Rights and the WTO: 
The Case of Patents and Access to Medicine by Holger Hestermeyer and 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface by 
Laurece R. Helfer and Graeme W. Austin have been of great importance for 
the writing of this thesis. For the subject of incentivizing the search for new 
drugs, the Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: 
Intersections between public health, intellectual property and trade by the 
collaboration of the WIPO, WHO and WTO has been used as a starting 
point, along with the reform strategies presented by Thomas W. Pogge in 
Human Rights and Global Health: a Search Program. The report by Oxfam 
International Ending the R&D Crisis in Public Health: Promoting pro-poor 
medical innovation, available at the website of Oxfam, has been highly 
illuminating upon the entire topic of lack of incentive for pharmaceutical 
R&D for neglected diseases. 
 
 8 
There are several articles written on barriers to access to medicines, two 
articles by Paul Hunt has served to illustrate the tragic situation caused by 
neglected diseases: Neglected diseases: A  Human Rights Analysis, along 
with Human Rights responsibilities of the Pharmaceutical companies in 
relation to access to medicines. The writing of Anand Grover and others in 
Pharmaceutical Companies and Global lack of Access to Medicines: 
Strengthening Accountability under the Right to Health have helped to shed 
light on the role that pharmaceutical companies have in regards to access to 
medicines.   
 
The extent of CSR is a bit unsettled, however some precision has been 
achieved in recent years thanks to the writings of the UN Special 
Representative on Business and Human Rights: John Ruggie, and of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health: Paul Hunt. The Guidelines are 
not legally binding but serve as a tool for good practice and have been 
crucial for the topic of voluntary measures. As for a good business conduct 
portfolio and an illustrative hierarchy pyramid, appraisal goes to the article 
by Klaus Leisinger, Corporate Responsibilities for Access to Medicines. 
Finally for the purpose of reflecting the entire picture of CSR, the critical 
writing of Milton Friedman in The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
increase its profits has been very helpful and entertaining.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
The outline of the thesis will proceed as follows; chapter 2 will have an 
overview of the right to health presenting the legal outline for the access to 
medicines. What the right to health does and does not include and how the 
right should be understood will also be presented. Finally, the legal 
obligation to ensure access to medicines and who is primarily responsible 
for this obligation will be outlined, consequently answering the first 
question posted.  
 
The third chapter will have a brief presentation of patents in general as well 
as an overview of the TRIPS Agreement and the declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and public health: the Doha Declaration. The third chapter will 
contain an answer to the second question posted. There will also be a 
presentation of the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement along with the risks 
that follows. The recent Novartis decision will also be discussed.  
 
Chapter 4 will outline the concept of neglected diseases and explain the 
occurring market failure, in addition it will contain a presentation of 
different solutions and measures that can enhance the incentive for 
pharmaceutical companies to invest more R&D into neglected diseases. The 
answer to the third question will be presented in the same chapter.  
 
Chapter 5 and 6 examines voluntary mechanisms that are dedicated for the 
matter of improving business conduct, chapter 5 contains international 
frameworks and guidelines that are dedicated to the cause, while chapter 6 
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will deal with the concept of CSR and its sources. Question number 4 on 
how to influence the behavior of MNEs will hence be answered in the two 
chapters.  
 
Finally, in chapter 7 there will be a last concluding chapter on how to move 
forward from the situation of today to the solutions of tomorrow for 
incentivizing the search for new drugs.  
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2. The Right to Health  
 
2.1 The Legal Outline 
The right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is a 
fundamental human right, which every human being is entitled to in order to 
lead a life in dignity, wherever they may live. The international right to 
health, as articulated in article 12 of the ICESCR, and further elaborated by 
General Comments No. 14 of the CESCR, recognizes access to medicines as 
a core component to the right to health. This is confirmed by the 
Constitution of the WHO, adopted in 1946, and is also codified and can be 
found in numerous national constitutions as well as legally binding 
international human rights treaties. Every country in the world has affirmed, 
in one treaty or another, the right to health.  
 
The UDHR lays the foundation for the international framework for the right 
to health; in Article 25.1 it is clearly stated that “Everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services”. The ICESCR further provides the most comprehensive article on 
the right to health in international human rights law. In accordance with 
article 12.1 of the ICESCR, states parties recognize "The right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health"4. In the general accepted framework of the right to health, access to 
medicines is an essential component because inaccessibility to medicines 
prevents individuals from obtaining the medicine they need to prevent or 
treat medical condition, resulting in them falling below the highest 
attainable standard of health. Consequently, access to essential medicines is 
a necessary condition for leading a healthy and dignified life, without which 
the right to health itself would be meaningless.5    
However, the right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy. 
Good health is merely an aspiration that cannot be ensured by a state, nor 
can a state provide protection against every possible cause of human ill 
health. Instead, the right to health must be understood as a right to the 
enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary 
for the realization of the highest attainable standard of health, containing 
both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the right to control 
one's health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the 
right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, 
                                                
4 United Nations Economic and Social Council, The right to the highest attainable standard 
of health, E/C.12/2000/4 General Comments no 14, (article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 11 August 2000, paragraph 1-3 
5 Wu, Chuan- Feng, Transnational Pharmaceutical corporations´ legal and moral human 
rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines, Asian Journal of WTO and 
International Health Law and Policy (2012) p. 91 
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non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. By contrast, the 
entitlements include the right to a system of health protection that provides 
equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of 
health.6 Within the set of entitlements is the access to essential drugs, which 
as already stated, constitutes an integral part of the right to health.7This 
means that essential drugs must be available, accessible and of good quality, 
not only physically, but also economically to everyone without 
discrimination.8The right to health also requires that much needed new 
medicines are developed as soon as possible, including those needed to treat 
diseases, such as tuberculosis and malaria that largely affect the poor in 
developing countries, the so called neglected diseases.9 
 
2.2 The Legal Obligation to Ensure 
Access to Medicines 
Human rights are inspired by moral values, such as dignity, equality and 
access to justice. However, they are more than moral entitlements since they 
are legally guaranteed and legally enforceable.10 Under international human 
rights law the primary responsibility for ensuring the realization of human 
rights are placed on states. It is states that have ratified international human 
rights treaties and thus accepted obligation which are binding under 
international law. Domestic law also often contains obligations to give 
effect to human rights. States have therefore both national and international 
legal obligation to ensure human rights and take action towards the 
fulfillment of them, as well as remedy any human rights abuses. This 
applies also to actions that causes or are a result of neglected diseases.  
 
Individuals can be held responsible for a much smaller range of human right 
abuses such as war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, 
slavery, forced labor and forced disappearance. However, both the ICCPR 
article 2.1 and ICESCR article 2.1 require “State parties to the present 
Covenant” rather than non-state parties to “undertake steps to respect and 
ensure the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant”.   
 
                                                
6 United Nations Economic and Social Council, The right to the highest attainable standard 
of health, E/C.12/2000/4 General Comments no 14 (article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 11 August 2000, paragraph 8 
7 Hristova, Mirela, Are Intellectual Property Rights Human Rights? Journal of the Patent 
and Trademark Office Society, Vol. 93 (2011) p. 356 
8 Hunt, Paul, Neglected diseases, Social Justice and Human Rights: some preliminary 
observation, Special topics in social, economic and behavioural research report series: no. 6 (2007) p. 7 
9 Grover, Anand and others, Pharmaceutical Companies and Global lack of Access to 
Medicines: Strengthening Accountability under the Right to Health, Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics (2012) p. 234    
10 Hunt, Paul, Neglected diseases, Social Justice and Human Rights: some preliminary 
observation, Special topics in social, economic and behavioural research report series: no. 6 
(2007) p. 4 
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Generally speaking, to require that private MNEs to assume human rights 
responsibilities are hindered by a number of obstacles. Firstly, human rights 
are traditionally concerned with the relationship between the state and 
individuals and apply most exclusively to states. Secondly, the regulation of 
corporate conduct is usually treated as a matter of domestic law. In other 
words, it is for the state to regulate matters of social importance, such as 
access to medicines, and for MNEs to obey the law. Since there is no clear 
standard for human rights to which companies activities can be applied, 
requiring them to take responsibility for providing affordable medicines is 
both difficult and confusing.11Accordingly, corporations are not the 
principal targets of human rights concerns; only states can violate 
international human rights. It therefore rests upon states to do all they 
reasonably can to make sure that existing medicines are available in 
sufficient quantities within their jurisdiction. States may also have to make 
use of the TRIPS flexibilities such as the issue of compulsory licenses and 
thereby ensuring that medicine reach their jurisdiction in adequate 
quantities.12  
 
In addition, a fulfillment of a positive right such as the right to access to 
medicines is considered to belong to the public interventions, rather than 
MNEs. Since positive rights require a specific demand on societal resources 
for their fulfillment, it is both unreasonable and unrealistic to assign a legal 
responsibility to corporations that might force them to exhaust their 
resources to offer social goods or services. In accordance with ICESCR 
article 2, the right to access to medicines, under the right to health, is subject 
to the principle of progressive realization, meaning that unlike civil and 
political rights, the state is only obliged to take steps towards the 
progressive fulfillment of the right on the premise of available resources, 
and the state can claim scarcity of resources as a legitimate reason for not 
fulfilling the right. Since the progressive realization of the right to access to 
medicines means that pharmaceutical accessibility could only be 
progressively realized over time within available resources, the state has 
only an obligations to progressively fulfill the right to access to medicines to 
the extent that resources permit. Accordingly, since the state only has 
obligations for the fulfillment of the right stemming from so called soft- law 
obligations that have moral but no legal force, it would prove to be 
unreasonable and unjustified to place a heavier burden on MNEs, which are 
designed to serve primary economic purposes of profit maximization.13 
 
                                                
11 Wu, Chuan- Feng, Transnational Pharmaceutical corporations´ legal and moral human 
rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines, Asian Journal of WTO and 
International Health Law and Policy (2012) p. 82 
12 United Nations Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt, Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicine: The sexual and reproductive 
health context, Human Rights Center, University of Essex, UN General Assembly in 
A/63/263, dated 11 August 2008, p.8 
13 Wu, Chuan- Feng, Transnational Pharmaceutical corporations´ legal and moral human 
rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines, Asian Journal of WTO and 
International Health Law and Policy (2012) p. 100 
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2.3 Concluding Comments 
Although medical care and access to medicines are vital features of the right 
to health, almost two billion people lack access to essential medicines. 
Improving access to medicine could potentially save the lives of 10 million 
people each year.14But traditional international human rights law does not 
impose any direct or binding obligations on private actors, such as private 
pharmaceutical companies, even though they can play a major role in the 
improvement of access to medicines. This is simply because a private entity 
cannot assume human rights obligations in the same extent as a state.  
However, in recent years, there has been growing acceptance that private 
companies do have some human rights responsibilities.15This claim is 
supported by paragraph 42 of the CESCR General Comment No. 14 which 
states that: "While only States are parties to the ICESCR and thus ultimately 
accountable for compliance with it, all members of society ... [including the 
private business sector]…  have responsibilities regarding the realization of 
the right to health." 
The human rights responsibilities of MNEs will be discussed further in 
chapter 5.  
  
                                                
14Hunt, Paul and Joo Young Lee, Human Rights responsibilities of Pharmaceutical 
Companies in relation to access to medicines, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, (2012) 
p.1 
15Hunt, Paul, Neglected diseases: A  Human Rights Analysis, Special topics in social, 
economic and behavioural research report series; no. 6 (2007) p. 12 
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3. Medical Patents  
 3.1 Intellectual Property Law 
IP is the overall term for property in the creation of the mind, including 
inventions, literary and artistic works, but also images and designs.16 IP is 
divided in two fields, namely copyright and industrial property, and ensures 
the protection of ideas and designs in art and technology, in industry and in 
trade. It is due to the differences between the protection of literary and 
artistic creations on the one hand and distinctive signs and inventions on the 
other that there has been a division in IP.17  
 
Industrial property relates to objects that can be used in technology and 
industry, such as trademarks, trade names etc. and inventions in their 
various forms. Industrial property, unlike copyrights, is characterized by 
their usefulness and serves a particular economic purpose. From a public 
health standpoint, the most relevant form of IP is a patent, and it is the 
means for protection for inventions.18 Patent is the reward that the state 
grants the inventor for his contribution to the solution of a problem in 
technology or industry. Patent rights do not last forever but are specified for 
a limited period of time. The minimum period specified under article 33 of 
the TRIPS Agreement is 20 years. 
 
Patent protection for innovations concerning chemical, pharmaceutical and 
food products has been a very controversial subject in industrial property. 
The subject of patents protection of pharmaceutical compositions is vitally 
important, mainly because it is a subject with a strong social implication and 
touches upon a sensitive matter such as health and the quality of life. 
Secondly, the pharmaceutical industry relies to a large extent on costly 
R&D programs, which means that it is more necessary than in other areas to 
protect them with patent protection. This is also due to the fact that 
pharmaceutical products are very often relatively easy to copy.19 If there is 
no tight control of legal assurance regarding exclusivity of both the process 
and the resulting product, it is quite easy for second comers or free- riders to 
replicate the breakthrough drugs in a generic version. For example, with the 
right information, a second comer can put into the market within a period of 
about six months a product that took over ten years of pharmaceutical 
R&D.20  
 
                                                
16 http://www.who.int/topics/intellectual_property/en/ (as accessed on 26 February 2013) 
17 Salazar, Silvia, Intellectual Property and Human Right, Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights, WIPO (1998) p. 67 
18 Ibid p. 68 
19 Ibid p. 71 
20 Oguamanam, Chidi, Patents and Pharmaceutical R&D: Consolidating Private-Public 
Partnership Approach to Global Public Health Crises (2010) p. 556   
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3.1.1 Adverse Effects of Patents in Relation to 
Access to Medicines 
Medical patents affect access to medicines in two distinct ways, firstly by 
allowing the patent holder to become a monopoly supplier for a period of 20 
years, subsequently creating a barrier to access to medicines for the people 
who cannot afford the much higher monopoly price. An example that can 
illustrate this unfortunate situation is the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic. 
After a series of successful ARV drugs, AIDS has been transformed into a 
chronic disease instead of deadly as it was before the year 1996. But 
whereas the accessibility for ARV drugs in North America and Europe for 
people in need is between 75% and 100%, in Africa it is just 0.1% of the 
28.5 million people living with AIDS that have access to the much needed 
drugs. In these countries over 50% lack access to essential medicines 
because they cannot afford it. For instance, the cocktail for ARV drugs cost 
around USD 10,000 per patient per year, and the average income for people 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is USD 1,600 a year. Now, an Indian manufacturer 
can offer the same drug for a cost of USD 350, however, this product cannot 
be sold in many countries because the inventor has a patent there and a 
generic version of the drug would be an infringement under the international 
patent system.21 Until 1994 the problem was not acute, since countries could 
then decide whether they wanted to grant pharmaceutical patents or not. 
However, after the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement this situation 
changed radically since no member state is longer allowed to exclude 
certain fields of technology from patentability. For many critics it is clear 
that the patent system, especially after the implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement, and the pharmaceutical industry are causing barriers to essential 
medicine in developing countries.  
 
Medical patents can also affect access to medicine by the way 
pharmaceutical companies choose to channel their R&D for diseases that 
predominantly occurs in more affluent countries, since they increase the 
likelihood for them to recoup their investments. For instance, it is much 
more profitable for pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs for hair 
removing cream than develop a cure for African sleeping sickness. This can 
be illustrated by the Sanofi-Aventis incident in the mid 1990s. Sanofi- 
Aventis was the first pharmaceutical company to produce a cure for the 
usually deadly late stage of sleeping sickness, but the company stopped 
making the drug in 1995 because it was not profitable enough, and instead 
the drug came to another use as an ingredient in a hair removing cream, a 
product that was successful in developed countries. The company later got 
pressured into donating its drug to the WHO, however this does not change 
the fact that these decisions are consciously being made by pharmaceutical 
companies, because, simply, the need does not match the market.22  
                                                
21 Ley, Björn, Are Patents really the only Barrier for Good Health Care in Developing 
Countries? Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights: Tensions and Convergences, 
vol. 2 (2007) p.102 
22 Oguamanam, Chidi, Patents and Pharmaceutical R&D: Consolidating Private-Public 
Partnership Approach to Global Public Health Crises (2010) p. 561 
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3.1.2 Justification Grounds 
Inventions are a textbook example of a market failure. An inventor puts time 
and money into the research and development of a product, especially the 
pharmaceutical industry depends largely on costly R&D programs and 
capital investment is primarily directed to research and clinical trials, as 
opposed to the actual manufacturing process of medications. Newly 
developed medical treatments often turn out to be unsafe or not effective 
enough, to have bad side effects, or to fail getting government approval for 
some other reason, which may lead to the loss of the entire investment.23 In 
addition, the culture of medical research emphasizes very early disclosure of 
inventions, usually long before a resulting product can be placed on the 
market. This is because scientists working in the field of human pathology 
have an obligation to share their findings as soon as possible with their peers 
so that those peers will be able to benefit from the new knowledge in their 
own research.24 
 
The incentive to invest in inventions would decrease if not sufficient return 
would be received. Patents are a way of resolving this market failure, seeing 
that the patent holder becomes a monopoly supplier which will give the 
inventor adequate time to recoup his investment. The bottom line is; patents 
provide the means whereby the inventor can recover his investment, and 
without it he would not invest. But does this justify the fact that poor people 
are being denied access to lifesaving drugs? The answer must sadly be 
answered in the affirmative. At stake is the balance between the medicine 
for the diseases of today and those of tomorrow. Any justification on the 
ground of incentive relies on the fact that patents actually do spur research 
and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. The incentive argument 
therefore discourages any exception to patent law. If exceptions for 
medicine for serious diseases are made, then the incentive to innovate is lost 
in the area where it is needed the most.25 
 
In addition, access to medicine is multifaceted. There are many impediments 
to providing individuals in developing countries with access to essential 
medicines. Proper access to medicines requires a health system with 
qualified personnel, capacity to distribute the drugs, testing facilities, and 
other related capacity to effectively administer the drugs. Many countries 
lack even the basic infrastructure such as access to water. These are 
formidable obstacles, and the political leadership of some countries may 
lack the means and/or the will to overcome them, and the funding necessary 
to solve these problems is often well above what would be necessary to 
                                                
23 Pogge, Thomas, Human Rights and Global Health: a research Program, vol. 36, (2005) p. 
185 
24 Hristova, Mirela, Are Intellectual Property Rights Human Rights? Journal of the Patent 
and Trademark Office Society, vol. 93 (2011) p. 357 
25 Hestermeyer, Holger, Human Rights and the W TO: The Case of Patents and Access to 
Medicine (2008) p.158-159 
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acquire patented drugs. Therefore, where patents rank on this list of barriers 
to access can be discussed.26   
Finally, very few rights are absolute in the sense that any interference with 
them violates the right. Most human rights provisions can be limited if 
certain conditions are fulfilled. This means that the interference of patents in 
developing countries with the right to access to medicine could be justified 
under human rights law.27Accordingly, under a human rights approach the 
benefits stemming from patents can be distributed without the patent-
holder´s authorization in order to meet social needs that are likewise 
classified as fundamental.28 
 
3.2 The TRIPS Agreement  
The WTO´s TRIPS Agreement was signed in 1995 and is the leading 
multilateral treaty regulating the protection of inventions. Its aim is to 
harmonize the basics of IP law standards and improving the overall 
framework conditions for the transfer of knowledge and technology in a 
global marketplace,29 as well as limiting the risks of unjustified free-riding 
by securing to inventors and creators a return on their investments from the 
sale or licensing of innovative knowledge goods anywhere within the global 
market for goods and services regulated by the TRIPS Agreement.30 
 
Before the 1990s there were no patent protections for medicines allowing 
developing countries to quite freely regulate public health without the 
interference of international IP law. States could even choose to deny patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals entirely. Before the TRIPS Agreement 
entered into force many middle- income developing countries such as Brazil 
and Argentina had therefore the ability to produce low-cost generic 
medicines. This made it possible for even poor states to acquire certain low-
cost generic medicines on the world market. However, after the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the expiration of the 
transitional periods in 2005 the situation changed radically. All developing 
countries, except for the least developing countries, must adopt and enforce 
all TRIPS patent standards, including standards regulating medicines in all 
WTO member countries, leaving the availability of medicines dependent on 
                                                
26 Hestermeyer, Holger, Human Rights and the W TO: The Case of Patents and Access to 
Medicine (2008) p.150 
27 Ibid p.152 
28 Dreyfuss, Roshelle C., Patents and Human Rights: W here is the paradox? (2010) p.74  
29Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 15 April 1994, in World 
Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of The Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations 321 (1999) available at http://www.wto.org (as accessed on 3 April 
2013) 
30 Abbott, Friedrich, The Doha round´s public health legacy: Strategies for the production 
and diffusion of patented medicines under the amended TRIPS provision, Journal of 
International Economic Law (2007) p. 924 
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different price-strategies adopted by pharmaceutical companies instead.31As 
long as an invention meets the technical requirements of patentability a 
patent must be granted for an inventive product, including a pharmaceutical 
compound, even if it would negatively impact the accessibility of drugs.32 
 
The core of the conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and access to 
medicines is the claim that patents on pharmaceuticals raise prices, and 
consequently constituting a barrier to the accessibility of drugs. The 
monopoly of the patent holder allows the pharmaceutical companies to 
charge excessively high prices for their drugs and this position may lead to 
the patent owner abusing his exclusive position on the market.33 
 
3.3 The Flexibilities of TRIPS 
The TRIPS Agreement has some safeguards installed to tackle public health 
problems. Apart from the more general articles about the desire to balance 
and facilitate the right to health, there are mainly three solutions that are 
supposed to facilitate access to cheap medicines in developing countries. 
 
Article 27.1 states that it is no longer possible for member states to exclude 
medicines from patentability and accordingly allow generic 
pharmaceuticals. Article 27.2 in the TRIPS Agreement, however, permits 
states to exclude patentability for inventions if they pose a threat to human 
life or health. The TRIPS Agreement also provides states discretion in 
enacting and amending their laws and regulations in order to help them 
promote public health goals. Furthermore, Article 30 allows states to restrict 
the exclusive privilege created through patent rights. It should be noted, 
however, that both article 27.2 and 30 are subject to certain limitations. For 
instance, under article 30, states may not grant exceptions that unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interest of the patent owner.  
 
The first solution, and the most relevant article in the TRIPS regarding 
access to medicine, is the right for governments to issue compulsory 
licenses enshrined in article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. It authorizes the 
use of a patented product or process without the patent holder´s consent, 
provided that adequate remuneration is paid. The state must first attempt to 
negotiate with the patent holder for a voluntary license, if this fails a 
member state can then waiver this requirement in the case of a national 
emergency such as public health. Exercising this right, a government can 
force down the price of a patented invention by compelling the patent holder 
to license it to other producers for a set percentage (typically below 10%) of 
                                                
31 Abbott, Friedrich, The Doha round´s public health legacy: Strategies for the production 
and diffusion of patented medicines under the amended TRIPS provision, Journal of 
International Economic Law (2007) p. 927 
32 Helfer, Laurence and Austin, Graeme W. Human Rights and Intellectual Property: 
mapping the Global Interface (2011) p.120 
33 Hestermeyer, Holger, Human Rights and the W TO: The Case of Patents and Access to 
Medicine (2008) p.138 
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the latter´s sales revenues.34Developing countries can thus resort to 
compulsory licensing—either by threat or actual imposition—in order to 
persuade pharmaceutical companies to lower the prices of specific 
medicines to the point where they become available to a mass market 
consumers in need of them and not just to affluent members of any given 
community. This situation is a violation of the patent holders´ rights, since it 
creates competition on the market, however, compulsory licensing is 
indispensable in situations where the patent holder refuses to supply a 
market. 
 
The second option under the TRIPS Agreement is parallel trade. Parallel 
trade occurs when a product covered by IP rights sold by, or with the right 
holder´s consent in State A, is re-sold in another State B without the right 
holder´s permission. This may occur when there is a significant difference 
in price. The TRIPS Agreement leaves the decision to allow parallel imports 
on the states.35   
 
Another option available under the TRIPS to facilitate access to medicines 
is the use of price controls. The TRIPS Agreement does not prohibit the use 
of price controls and it is already a feature of the pharmaceutical industry in 
rich and poor countries. Price controls affect the profits of manufacturers in 
a similar way as compulsory licensing, however, the right owners are more 
willing to abide to price controls since they retain the control over 
distribution.36 
 
3.4 The Doha Declaration  
The unanimously concluded Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health reflects a series of unrelated and unexpected events, 
instead of a true convergence of opinion. A few months before the Doha 
meeting, developed countries and pharmaceutical companies continued to 
insist that issues besides patents were the true hurdles to access to 
medicine.37After the expiry of the TRIPS transition periods a social tension 
was created due to the restrictions on access to generic medicine in 
developing countries, especially after the AIDS pandemic.  In a response to 
the growing crisis that was threatening the stability of the WTO itself, the 
WTO adopted the Doha Declaration in November 2001. The Declaration 
reconfirms many of the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement, 
including the right for member states to issue compulsory licenses to 
produce low- cost drugs in national health emergencies, while at the same 
                                                
34 Pogge, Thomas, Human Rights and Global Health: A  research Program, vol. 36, (2005) 
p.187 
35 See article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement 
36 Ley, Björn, Are Patents really the only Barrier for Good Health Care in Developing 
Countries? Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights: Tensions and Convergences, 
vol. 2 (2007) p. 121 
37 Ho, Cynthia, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on 
Patents and Related Rights (2011) p. 337 
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time acknowledging that states with insufficient domestic manufacturing 
capabilities cannot make effective use of such licenses.38  
 
The language in the preamble of the Declaration is consistent with the 
general premise that patents are not inherently in conflict with public health. 
In addition, the declaration confirms that TRIPS does in fact “contribute to 
the availability of medicines”, accordingly since it provides an incentive for 
the development of drugs, focus being on future development rather than 
current access. The fact that there is a higher cost for patented drugs is 
discreetly sanctioned by the statement that “strong” protection is necessary, 
as strong protection generally means there will be no or only minimal 
exceptions to patent rights.39 
 
The Declaration also clarifies that TRIPS can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of the WTO Member´s right to protect 
public health and in particular to promote access to medicine for all. It also 
allowed the least developing countries to defer from the obligation to extend 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products until 2016. 
 
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration reflects the international consensus that the 
TRIPS Agreement posed a barrier to providing low-cost generic drugs to 
some poor countries and that the TRIPS Council should take action. 
However, the impact of that article was to be radically affected by 
unexpected events. At the terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11 
2001, there was a bioterrorism threat involving mailed anthrax. Canada 
initially stated it would issue a compulsory license on the patented antibiotic 
to ensure adequate supplies to treat anthrax inhalation, and a US official 
stated the United States was contemplating a similar move. Although no 
compulsory licenses were ultimately issued, the United States was widely 
mocked for its hypocrisy. The United States had condemned the use of 
compulsory licenses to treat HIV pandemics, but considered issuing a 
compulsory license for its own use to address an unrealized threat of limited 
scope.40 
 
Although the Declaration was unanimously concluded, competing views of 
patents remains in the form of divergent interpretations of the Declaration. 
 
3.5 The Risks of Compulsory Licenses 
The use of TRIPS flexibilities, such as the issue of compulsory licenses, can 
lead to significant cost savings and increases in coverage. However, an 
                                                
38 Helfer, Laurence and Austin, Graeme W. Human Rights and Intellectual Property: 
mapping the Global Interface (2011) p. 123 
39Ho, Cynthia, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on 
Patents and Related Rights (2011) p. 338 
40Dyer, Geoff and Michaels, A Bitter Pill for Drug Makers, The Financial Times (London), 
(2001) p. 27  
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important matter to raise regarding the possibilities for a member state to 
issue compulsory licenses is the political risks that these actions can cause. 
 
In 2006 and 2007 Thailand issued a total of seven compulsory licenses for a 
combination of ARVs and medicines used to treat cardiovascular disease 
and cancer, and in 2007 Brazil followed with a single compulsory license 
for HIV/AIDS. Even though it was permitted under the TRIPS, criticism of 
the compulsory licenses issued by Thailand came from several sources, such 
as the EU Trade Commissioner, United States Senators, The Wall Street 
Journal and even the WHO Director General who retaliated by withdrawing 
seven pending applications for registration for new medicines from Thai 
Food and Drug Administration. Brazil faced similar opposition. In 2005 
Brazil announced that they were considering issuing a compulsory license 
for tenofovir41. After their announcement, Brazil was criticized by a number 
of US Congressmen, the CEO of PhRMA42 as well as Executive President 
of the Brazilian Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry. Brazil tried to first 
negotiate with the patent holder for lower prices, but when this failed it 
turned to the flexibilities and issued a compulsory license. This lead to 
criticism from Merck, which was “profoundly disappointed” as well as from 
the Brazil Council that stated that it was “a major step backward” and that it 
would discourage investment in Brazil.43 
 
Despite the Doha Declaration´s confirmation of the right to use the TRIPS 
flexibilities, taking advantage of the same requires both the legal capacity 
and the political ability to resist external pressure.   
 
3.6 The Novartis Decision 
On 1 April 2013 the Supreme Court of India delivered judgment on an 
appeal by Novartis against rejection by the India Patent Office of a product 
patent application for a specific compound used to treat chronic leukemia, 
which was marketed by Novartis as “Glivec”.44 The judgment ended a 
seven- year battle by the Swiss drug-maker to get a patent in India on its 
leukemia drug. The medication, which was approved for use in the USA 
back in 2001, has been produced generically by Indian pharmaceuticals for 
years at a fraction of the Swiss drug´s cost.45   
The Supreme Court rejected the claim from Novartis and the reasoning 
behind the decision was that the latest version of the drug Glivec did not 
                                                
41 A crucial virus enzyme in HIV and hepatitis B virus infections used to block reverse 
transcriptase.  
42 PhRMA: Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America is probably the most 
powerful, effective and influential industrial interest and pressure group.    
43 So, Anthony and Sachs, Rachel, Making Intellectual Property work for Global Health, 
Harvard International Law Journal (2012) p. 113-114  
44 Judgement of the India Supreme Court as delivered on 1 April 2013, Novartis AG vs. 
Union of India & Others, CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2706-2716 OF 2013, sections 3-5. 
45 Mahr, Krista, The Novartis Decision: Is the Big W in for Indian Pharma Bad news for 
Investment? Available at http://world.time.com (as accessed on 1 April 2013)  
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differ enough from the previous version. The ruling of the Court should be 
interpreted that new innovative medicines will still be able to be granted 
patent protection in India, however, pharmaceutical companies will no 
longer be able to be granted patents for minor alterations on a drug.  
Indian drug companies and health activists have welcomed the delivered 
judgment by the Supreme Court. The latter has called the decision a win for 
patients seeking cheaper treatment and being against pharmaceutical 
companies making minor tweaks to an already existing drug in order to 
prolong the company´s patent protection in order to deny other firms to 
produce the drug as a cheaper generic version once the patent has expired.  
The effects of the decision are yet to be seen, however, the fact that India is 
creating a tough environment for global companies to continue to invest in 
new drugs is a cause of criticism for the Court ruling. In a statement, 
Novartis said that the Supreme Court´s decision “discourages innovative 
drug discovery essential to advancing medical science for patients” and that 
the decision “discourages further innovation within the pharmaceutical 
field”.46According to Novartis, 95% of the more than 16 000 patients who 
are prescribed Glivec in India already receive it free of charge through the 
company´s donation program.47  
 
3.7 Concluding Comments 
States must according to the ICESCR guarantee the economic accessibility 
of medicines, and developing countries can only do so by guaranteeing a 
reasonable price level. Providing corporations with the possibility to patent 
pharmaceuticals goes against that obligation, since it results in a higher 
price level of those products. Given the effect on price that patents may 
have, patents would then indeed interfere with the right to access to 
medicine at least in developing countries, as higher prices reduce the 
accessibility of the medicine for the poor. More importantly, this effect 
cannot be compensated by developing countries, since they lack the 
resources to pay for the higher prices themselves.48 
There is therefore an inherent conflict between patent rights for 
pharmaceutical companies and access to medicines. Some authors argue that 
the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement are sufficient to provide the 
necessary balance between access to medicine and patent protection.49 
However, it is quite clear that neither the TRIPS nor the Doha Declaration 
managed successfully to facilitate the balance required between IP law and 
                                                
46 http://www.sydsvenskan.se/varlden/dom-oppnar-for-lagprismedicin/ (as accessed on 2 
April 2013) 
47 http://world.time.com/2013/04/01/the-novartis-decision-is-the-big-win-for-indian-
pharma-bad-news-for-investment/#ixzz2QafdyF99 (as accessed on 1 April 2013) 
48 Hestermeyer, Holger, Human Rights and the W TO: The Case of Patents and Access to 
Medicine (2008) p.138 
49 Ibid p.169- 170 
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access to medicines. Essentially, what the TRIPS Agreement achieved was 
to introduce a 20-year patent protection worldwide, however it failed 
manifestly to boost R&D in pharmaceuticals to satisfy the needs of 
developing countries. Furthermore, the risks that the state issuing 
compulsory licenses exposes itself to, political and economical, economical 
in the sense that the issuing country will have trouble attracting foreign 
investments, it might be necessary to rethink the flexibilities of the TRIPS 
Agreement and instead focus on other solutions not strictly related to 
patents.  
The recent Novartis decision can be seen as a victory for the Indian drug 
industry, but it might also be seen as a victory for the right to health and 
access to medicines, since the pharmaceutical company was denied a patent 
allowing a much cheaper generic medicine to be sold for cancer patients. 
What will be the consequences of this judgment then? Most likely it will 
have a devastating affect on foreign investments in India, and the judgment 
has already been described as a stunning defeat for IP rights in India.  
However, the decision might also be leading a world where judicial 
decisions from countries such as China, India and Brazil have an increasing 
global reach and can contribute to shaping global approaches to IP. The 
decision may also bring focus on the growing role played by the judiciary in 
developing countries in the implementation of international IP rules, such as 
the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration, which both affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a way 
consistent with the right to protect public health, and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all. The growing role of the judiciary on IP 
matters in developing countries could also bring changes to the extent these 
countries are willing to go beyond the minimum standards that are contained 
in TRIPS.50 
  
                                                
50 Abdel Latif, Ahmed, The Novartis Decision: A  Tale of Developing Countries, IP and The 
Role Of The Judiciary, published on 15 April 2013, also available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/ as accessed on 16 April 2013 
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4. Neglected Diseases and 
the Lack of Incentive 
4.1 The Concept of Neglected 
Diseases 
The term “neglected diseases” refers to diseases that continue to burden the 
poorest of the poor. They have by the WHO been defined as those diseases 
primarily affecting those living in poverty, especially in rural areas in low-
income countries and they include diseases such as river blindness, leprosy, 
African sleeping sickness and dengue. In recent years HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria are also being regarded as neglected diseases.51   
Neglected diseases can further be divided into three main categories: Type I 
diseases are found in both rich and poor countries and affect large numbers 
of vulnerable populations in both. Examples of type I diseases are measles, 
hepatitis B, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and tobacco-related illnesses. 
Type II diseases can be found in both rich and poor countries, but a 
substantial proportion of cases, over 90%, occurs in poor countries. 
Examples of such diseases include HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. Type III 
diseases are those that are overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in 
developing countries. Examples of such diseases include African sleeping 
sickness and African river blindness.52  
 
Neglected diseases are both a cause and consequence of human rights 
violations. The unavailability of medical technologies to effectively address 
these neglected diseases is one of the major problems associated with 
tackling this human health tragedy. The situation has been characterized by 
a chronic lack of investment in R&D to find effective treatments for 
neglected diseases. An R&D system exclusively based on IP does not generate 
sufficient economic incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop 
medicines needed predominantly in poor countries. Today, funding for R&D 
for these diseases comes predominantly from the public sector.53  
 
                                                
51 UN Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt, Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Companies in Relation to Access to Medicine: The sexual and reproductive health context, 
(2008) p.14 
52 WTO, WIPO and WHO, Promoting access to Medical Technologies and Innovation 
Intersections between public health, intellectual property and trade (2013) p. 115 
53 Ibid p.116 
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4.2 Overcoming the Market Failure: 
the Challenge of Neglected 
Diseases 
The debate on access to medicines has so far been centered on the claim that 
patents held by pharmaceutical companies are a significant contributor to 
the miserable health outcomes experienced by people in the poorest parts of 
the world. This claim is based on the premise that pharmaceutical 
companies use their patents to withhold drugs from poorer people in order 
to maximize their profits. However, this premise is not completely true, 
seeing that 95 % of the WHO´s essential drugs have never been or are no 
longer patented and most AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis medication is not 
patented in the countries that are hardest hit. Pharmaceutical companies 
need to patent drugs where there are manufacturing capacity in order to 
prevent others from manufacturing the drugs without consent; many 
developing countries lack the capacity to manufacture.54  
 
Patent protection means little when there is no significant market at the end 
of the process, which results in grossly underfinanced R&D where it is 
needed the most. To put it roughly: poor countries benefit from R&D 
mainly when the rich also suffers from the same diseases.55 A new drug will 
therefore remain unavailable for a majority of the world´s population that 
resides in developing countries and least developing countries, creating a 
“10/90 gap”, meaning that only 10% of the global health research is devoted 
to conditions that account for 90% of the global disease burden.56 The 
current situation can be illustrated by numbers that make it even clearer: The 
UNDP has stated that only 0.2% of the global health-related R&D goes to 
pneumonia, diarrheal diseases and tuberculosis which account for 18% of 
the global disease burden.57The global disease burden is defined by 
measures using a disability-adjusted life year, which combines years of life 
lost due to premature mortality, and years of life lost due to time lived in 
states of less than full health.58  
 
There are mainly three barriers that hinder progress in developing new 
medicines. First of all it is insufficient financing, meaning that R&D for 
neglected diseases receives only $1 out of every $100,000 spent worldwide 
on biomedical research and product development, and only 16% of funding 
for product development partnerships is provided by governments of rich 
countries. Secondly, it is the lack of bold and creative thinking about 
incentive mechanisms, new mechanisms such as product-development 
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partnerships and orphan drug programs, should be applauded for their 
support to crucial R&D and are evidence of an openness to new ideas. 
Thirdly, it is the absence of coordination concerning R&D, since without 
coordination within and between countries, resources are used less 
efficiently and important needs are being neglected.59 
 
4.3 Incentivizing the Search for New 
Drugs 
The exclusive reliance on patent monopolies as the only mechanism for 
innovation remains a major barrier to R&D for neglected diseases. However, 
there are new approaches under discussion that improve knowledge sharing and 
follow-on innovation, or which are dedicated to avoid the reliance on patent-
based monopolies as an incentive mechanism for private firms. These 
incentives involve a diverse group of actors and a large number of 
collaborative partnerships that are working to address the lack of medical 
innovation for neglected diseases. While many proposals are under 
discussion, various new measures are already being applied.   
 
4.3.1 Patent Pools and Prize Funds 
One such mechanism under consideration at the WHO Global Strategy is 
the use of patent pools. A patent pool is an agreement between two or more 
parties to license one or more of their patent to a collective “pool” which 
then can be used by any third party. The use of patent pools have many 
benefits, first of all it enables collective management of IP for use by third 
parties for a licensing fee, it facilitates follow-on innovation for appropriate 
formulations and “fixed-dose” combinations, as well as reducing medicine 
prices through generic competition. A patent pool overcomes the hurdle of 
patents that prevents researchers from sharing and using knowledge to develop 
new clues for vaccines or medicines; in addition it can improve access to 
existing medicines.60 
 
The use of prize funds is another mechanism that is designed to expand 
incentives for R&D beyond those that support the existing system of IP 
ownership. The system offers innovators a cash prize that reflects the 
contribution of a product aimed to public health. Prizes are particularly 
effective for promoting access since they do not require that the 
expenditures of R&D to be recouped through excessive medicine prices.  
Prizes constitute an innovative “pull” mechanism that is aimed to overcome 
the link of innovation and drug prices. Inventors are offered a cash prize that 
reflects the product´s contribution to public health. While prizes enable an 
inventor to maintain a patent, it also requires the recipient of a prize to 
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surrender the monopoly rights in exchange for the reward, consequently 
ensuring generic competition, which will lead price reductions. The use of 
prize funds can also stimulate follow-on innovation since prizewinners are 
asked to place their scientific knowledge in the public domain.61  
 
In addition to incentives, building a scientific capacity of the developing 
world could potentially lower the costs of drug development, create new 
centers of innovation, broaden the range of diseases targeted by 
pharmaceutical R&D, and finally ensure that R&D costs are shared more 
equitable between all countries. The development of local and regional 
manufacturing, clinical-trials capacity and scientific expertise would 
eventually repay the investment.62    
 
4.3.2 The TRIPS Solution 
The classic solution for the market failure of lack of pharmaceutical R&D is 
enshrined in the TRIPS agreement, which is simply patent protection for 20 
years. The ability to exclude competitors from copying and selling newly 
invented drugs during that period the patent holder will be able to sell it at a 
profit-maximizing monopoly price well above the marginal cost of 
production. Through this, the patent holder can recoup his research and 
overhead expenses as well as some of the cost of other research efforts that 
failed to bear fruit.  
 
This solution corrects the market failure of undersupply of medical 
innovation, however its monopoly features create another. During the 
patent´s duration the monopoly pricing will cause a barrier to access the 
medicine because of its excessively high prices.  
  
4.3.3 The Differential- Pricing Strategy 
The differential-pricing strategy comes in different variants. One version is 
to have the inventor firms themselves offer their propriety drugs to different 
customers at different prices (positive price- discrimination) and in that way 
realizing a large profit margin from sales to the more affluent without 
having to renounce sales to poorer buyers at a lower margin. Another 
version is the state government’s right to issue compulsory licenses under 
the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
In order for the differential- pricing strategy to be successful, different 
categories of buyers must be prevented from knowing about the prices for 
other categories. If a drug would be sold at a lower price to some, then many 
buyers who are willing and able to pay the higher price will find a way to 
buy at a lower price. This would create an incentive to divert, and instead 
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smuggle drugs sold cheaper back into more affluent countries leading to 
great losses.63 The knowledge of this has led to many pharmaceutical 
companies shying away from adopting differential-pricing methods, 
resulting in the exclusion of poor people who are willing and able to pay a 
price above the marginal cost of the drugs, but who cannot afford the much 
higher monopoly price. Such exclusions are accepted for other IP rights, 
however it is morally problematic regarding essential drugs.       
4.3.4 The Public Goods Strategy 
The public goods reform strategy is based on the idea that the results of any 
successful effort to develop a new essential drug are to be provided as a 
public good that all pharmaceutical companies may use free of charge. This 
reform would eliminate the market failure associated with high monopoly 
pricing by allowing competition to bring prices of new essential drugs down 
close to their marginal cost of production. In order for this reform to be 
successful it is necessary for it to be global in scope, because implemented 
in only a few countries this reform strategy would suffer the same problems 
as the ones associated with the differential- pricing strategy, that is; cheaper 
drugs produced in countries adhering the public goods strategy will seep 
back into countries adhering to the monopoly- patent regime.64  
 
Another feature of the reform strategy is that inventor firms should be 
rewarded for their patent of essential drugs (during the life of the patent) out 
of public funds, in proportion to the impact on their invention on the global 
disease burden. This will lead to a massive shifting in incentive in a highly 
desirable way, since disease which have a great impact on the global disease 
burden, such as neglected diseases, will suddenly be highly attractive to 
treat.65  
 
The downside of this strategy lies with the issue of classification. This can 
be exemplified by the concept of “drug cocktails” that combine various 
drugs that frequently have been developed by different companies. To make 
it work, the reform strategy must formulate clear and transparent rules for 
distributing the overall reward, based on the impact of the drug cocktail, 
among the inventors of the drug it contains.66 
 
Effective implementation of this strategy would require that most of its costs 
to be borne by the industrialized countries, not an overall heavy burden 
considering that 16 % of the world´s population control about 81 % of the 
global social product. The taxpayers must however be given compelling 
reasons as to why to support it, since they are the ones paying. The benefits 
of this reform strategy, would it be implemented, are many. For starters, 
taxpayers of the more affluent countries will gain considerable benefits for 
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themselves in form of lower drug prices, since under the current regime 
affluent persons in need of essential drugs pay high prices for them, either 
directly or through their contributions to insurance companies. The public 
goods regime would benefit less-healthy citizens at the expense of the 
healthier ones. The fair distribution of the effects of luck is morally 
appealing, since fortunate persons can have the peace of mind knowing that 
they would have access to cutting- edge medical knowledge would they ever 
need it.67 Secondly, the idea of allowing poor people to free-ride on the 
pharmaceutical research conducted for the benefit of citizens in the affluent 
countries is morally compelling. Thirdly, leaving the moral aspect, the 
reform would actually create top-notch medical- research jobs in the 
industrialized countries. It would enable the developed countries to respond 
better to future public-health emergencies by increasing and having a more 
diversified arsenal of medical knowledge. In addition, better human health 
around the world would reduce the risk of invasive diseases transiting from 
poor countries in to the developed countries, such as the SARS and swine 
flue outbreak. The current neglect of the medical needs of the poor 
populations leaves the developed countries unprepared to deal with such 
problems when suddenly confronted with them.68 
 
4.3.5 The R&D Treaty 
The current system for R&D of new medicines does not adequately meet the 
needs of the majority of the world´s population. The idea of a binding 
international convention on R&D has been debated since at least 2004, and 
in April 2012 the WHO Consultative Expert Working Group on R&D 
recommended that governments begin to negotiate over a global medical 
R&D convention to address some of the problems caused by lack of 
incentive in a systemic way. The aim of the proposal is to create a new 
global framework for supporting priority medical R&D, based on the fair 
and equitable sharing of costs, access to benefits of R&D, and incentives to 
invest in needs- driven R&D consistent with human rights and with the goal 
of all sharing in the benefits of scientific advancement.69 
The shortcoming of the current regime is that patents are today used as a 
method to drive investments into medicine R&D. Prior to the TRIPS 
Agreement, there was a great variation amongst countries in the types of 
length of the patent life, on average industrialized countries granted longer 
patent protection (15-17 years) while developing countries offered shorter 
patent protection (5-10 years) and many countries made special exceptions 
for food, medicines and agricultural technologies. As a result of the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement this regime changed dramatically, 
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and medical patents must now be granted a 20-year protection in most WTO 
member states.70  
An R&D Treaty could complement and build on existing initiatives, but 
needs to address four areas that remain particularly weak, namely: 
affordability, sustainable financing, efficiency and equitable governance. 
 
Affordability: Currently there exists no system that ensures that new 
medicines will be affordable to the majority of people who need them. A 
treaty could therefore include measures to ensure affordability, such as new 
incentive mechanisms that incorporate the principle of de-linkage, meaning 
that pharmaceutical companies can include licensing through the medicines 
patent pools or the use treaty-generated funds to reward a prize to a 
successful drug-developer, both measures will allow competitive generic 
production of drugs.71    
 
Sustainable finance: Currently there are no mechanisms to ensure sufficient 
predictable financing for R&D to meet the health need in developing- and 
least developing countries. Donor governments and non-profit entities, such 
as the Gates Foundation, have indeed invested significantly into neglected 
diseases; as a result 140 products have been developed for the combat of 
neglected diseases. An R&D Treaty could include binding obligations on 
governments to contribute to R&D and thereby addressing the free-rider 
problem while at the same time establishing an equitable burden-sharing 
arrangement.  
 
Efficiency in innovation: There is considerable room for the improvement 
of the efficiency innovation process. For instance, by impeding the free flow 
of information, IP rights can impede the gathering of common knowledge 
that drives scientific progress forward. A treaty could therefore establish 
rules that would improve efficiency in innovation and could do so by global 
norms regarding research priorities and transparency in investment 
decisions. A treaty could further establish rules that would foster creativity 
such as incentives for faster global knowledge sharing.    
 
Equitable health-focused governance: Today, it is market incentives, and 
sadly not health needs, that drives private R&D investments. A treaty could 
here establish rules on governance arrangements to ensure that public 
interest drives innovation, instead of market-generated profits. As an 
example, treaty rules could structure financial rewards for innovation so that 
they are equal with a medicine´s health benefit.72   
 
Finally, a global health and pharmaceutical R&D treaty would elaborate on 
a framework for drug pricing within PPP initiatives that would ensure a 
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realistic and leaner pricing regime that focuses on a PPP model rather than 
to a direct market regime.73 
 
 
4.3.6 Public- Private Partnerships 
The concept of PPPs is usually used to describe collaboration between a 
government and at least one private-sector company. The collaboration is 
sometimes also referred to as product-development partnerships. Today, 
such partnerships manage a large proportion of all neglected diseases drug 
development projects worldwide. PPPs are characterized by the fact that 
they: integrate public-sector and private-sector approaches by generally 
using industry practices in their R&D activities, manage neglected diseases 
R&D portfolios and targets at least one neglected disease, are created for the 
purpose of pursuing public health objectives rather than commercial gains, 
as well as providing funding to cover existing research gaps and finally they 
ensure that the developed products are affordable.74   
The advantages that PPPs have is that they are able to complete the entire 
cycle of R&D at a far lower cost that the pharmaceutical industry working 
alone, and they can do so in a more transparent manner. Also, as non-profit 
entities, PPPs can take the matter of access into account. Non-patented 
products will encourage generic competition and lead to price reductions.75   
Due to the emergence of PPPs over the last 15 years there has been a major 
development in efforts to focus R&D towards neglected diseases. These 
partnerships have significantly increased the number of products in 
development for neglected diseases and they play an important role in 
identifying pathways to new research for these diseases.   
 
 4.3.6.1 The Gates Foundation 
The Gates foundation is a perfect example of a successful PPP that have 
lead to significant improvement in access to medicines in developing 
countries. The innovative partnership between the government of Botswana, 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Merck, managed for the first time 
in Africa to present a successful national effort to treat those living with 
HIV, to slow the transmission of the virus and to minimize the impact of the 
epidemic. The numbers of the new collaboration speak clearly as more than 
50% of those who can benefit from ARVs, and 85% of those with advanced 
HIV infection, are now receiving lifesaving drugs. These are the highest 
rates in Africa.  
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The main reason for the success story of Botswana was that the country had 
a relatively well-developed health care system and a political stability, 
supported by a President who was personally committed to the cause. 
Before the partnership, Botswana had one of the world´s highest rates of 
HIV infection; 33% among people aged 15-49. When researchers estimated 
in 2001 that half of all women in Botswana would die in AIDS in their 20s, 
the President of Botswana claimed that his country was “threatened with 
extinction”.76    
The wisdom gained by the collaborative PPP in Botswana is that it is 
difficult, yet possible, to scale up a national ARV program and save lives, 
despite what the critics say. Working closely with a national government 
can sometimes slow down a project; however, working directly with the 
government enables a collaboration to build up a nation with its own 
capacity.  
4.3.6.2 WIPO Re:Search 
 
In October 2011 WIPO started a collaboration between public-sector and 
private-sector researchers and BIO Ventures for Global Health was started, 
that launched a new consortium called WIPO Re:Search. With WIPO 
Re:Search, public-sector and private-sector organizations can share IP and 
expertise with the global health research community in order to promote 
development of new medicines, vaccines and diagnostics to treat neglected 
diseases.  Trough an innovative model, selected IP assets are available under 
royalty-free licenses to researchers anywhere in the world. The WIPO 
Re:Search aims to foster collaborations to advance and stimulate R&D for 
medicines, vaccines, and diagnostics for neglected diseases and the 
resources are aimed at facilitating new partnerships.  
 
In addition to pharmaceutical companies, members of WIPO Re:Search 
include universities and research centers from all over the world. Of 
particular importance are the research centers in Africa whose participation 
is an important component to the development of new and better treatments 
for neglected diseases. The products come to market will in turn be royalty-
free in all least developed countries, and royalties will be subject to 
negotiations for developing countries.   
 
WIPO Re:Search is grounded in voluntary agreements and operates on the 
basis of voluntary licenses.  It is based on the belief that IP and knowledge 
can be used creatively to stimulate more investment in R&D for new health 
solutions while ensuring access for the most disadvantaged population. By 
October 2012, WIPO Re:Search had 62 members and had facilitated 11 
research collaborations or agreements between WIPO Re:Search and 
members.77 
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The main tools that the WIPO Re:Search has developed will guarantee 
transparency and accessibility of information and facilitate collaboration and 
cross-sector partnerships. Its Public database contains IP assets that different 
providers have chosen to make available and accessed without registration. 
 
4.3.7 Orphan Drug Schemes and Tax Credits 
Orphan Drug schemes are used in the USA and EU and offers additional 
market exclusivity and financial benefits for new medicines for neglected 
diseases, or for diseases that affect relatively few people in the country that 
awards the benefit. The credits reward a manufacturer with tax benefits and 
an extended patent term. However, an issue is that extended market 
exclusivity under an Orphan Drug scheme may lead to abuses of the 
monopoly position in terms of unaffordable prices.  
 
Tax credits are often provided as a part of a package of benefits within the 
Orphan Drug scheme. For instance, in the USA, a tax credit is provided for 
50% of the cost of clinical trials that are conducted for R&D for rare 
diseases. Some countries have introduced additional tax credits in order to 
boost R&D on specific diseases that are for the time viewed as ”priority” 
diseases for developing countries. An example is the United Kingdom, 
which has an existing program that provides tax credits for R&D for 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.78  
 
These schemes provide important private incentives in order to encourage 
new pharmaceutical R&D. However, it is unlikely that they will function 
effectively on their own to create incentives for neglected diseases. The 
WHO noted that the Orphan Drug schemes are insufficient to stimulate 
sufficient innovation for neglected diseases, since the extended market 
exclusivity does not take into account the absence of a market in the 
developed country.  Tax credits on the other hand, function effectively as an 
incentive only where there are anticipated profits. Consequently, in order to 
ensure that tax credits function effectively, countries could consider 
designing credits that work together with other incentive schemes, such as 
credits that target contributions made by pharmaceutical companies to PPPs. 
These could then work across countries to build incentives to encourage 
private-sector research.  
4.4 Concluding Comments 
It is undisputed that more public financing for drug development for 
neglected diseases is needed, and this should be an obligation of both rich 
and poor countries. The different solutions presented above all have 
different strengths and weaknesses, some more clear and others still remain 
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to be discovered. None of the solutions are perfect, nor do they solve the 
market failure completely, however, they do offer a major improvement of 
the situation of today.   
 
For instance, the differential pricing strategy is an example of a measure that 
has already been adopted and several pharmaceutical companies have 
applied differential pricing to medicines for neglected diseases and for 
products that the WHO regards as essential.79This has lead to an 
improvement for developing countries to access essential medicines, since 
the positive price discrimination has allowed poorer countries to acquire the 
drug without the pharmaceutical companies having to renounce their profit.  
 
However, existing R&D mechanisms supported by developed countries 
remains severely under-funded. Public financing for R&D requires inputs 
both to ”push” and to ”pull”. Push financing means paying for basic 
scientific research that is translated into new medicine, or directly paying 
costs associated with bringing a medicine to the market, such as the usage of 
prize funds. Pull financing involves creating financial or market incentives 
for the private sector, or a public-private entity. The development of PPPs is 
a method of pull financing.  
 
Over the past decade, numerous PPPs have been launched to develop new 
medicines and vaccines, through a combination of resources from the public 
sector, philanthropy, and the pharmaceutical industry. While PPPs have 
certain problems that limit their effectiveness, they should be supported as 
one approach to generate R&D for neglected diseases. However, rich 
countries provide only 16% of funding for PPPs and philanthropic foundations 
provide the rest. For instance, the Gates Foundation provided 79% of the 
overall financing for the PPP in Botswana. Some countries, such as 
Germany, have given no money whatsoever, while the European 
Commission, as the primary funding source on behalf of the entire EU, has 
provided little support.80  
 
PPPs have been praised as the ideal solution to the lack of medicines for 
neglected diseases since they have proved effective in promoting and 
initiating considerable R&D activity. However, it is essential that funding is 
to be provided from other sources, and not primarily relied on 
philanthropically oriented foundations. This is where a potential R&D 
Treaty can step in and play a major role for the funding of PPPs or for 
pharmaceutical R&D in general. If a future R&D Treaty would be 
successfully implemented, then it would meaningfully overcome the market 
failure of neglected diseases.  
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5. Voluntary Mechanisms 
5.1 A wolf in sheep’s clothing? 
As already stated in chapter 2, there is no legally enforceable obligation 
under international human rights law for MNEs, including pharmaceutical 
companies, to ensure the protection and realization of human rights. The 
human rights responsibilities referred to in paragraph 42 of the CESCR 
General Comment No. 14 claim that all actors of society have a 
responsibility regarding the realization of the right to health. However, the 
same paragraph affirms that it is only states that can ultimately be held 
accountable, leaving the effectiveness of the claim to be a matter of 
discussion. Also, the nature and content of MNEs responsibilities is not 
defined any further in the Comment. Furthermore, a distinction must be 
made between on the one hand MNEs human rights responsibility to avoid 
infringing the human rights of others, and on the other a positive obligation 
to ensure access to medicines, which would require that private firms are to 
actively pursue and realize human rights. These are two different actions 
and must be treated as such.  
 
In order to improve corporate behavior and align it with international human 
rights law, focus must be turned to voluntary mechanisms that have been 
designed to promote good practice for businesses.    
 
Voluntary mechanisms serve a variety of purposes, to the extent that they 
are in conformity with market-based incentives, voluntary mechanisms may 
be effective in guiding corporate behavior. Voluntary guidelines formulated 
by multilateral institutions, including the UN, may operate as soft law and 
promote increased human rights accountability. Such mechanisms are an 
improvement of self-imposed codes to the extent that they align with the 
international human rights regime and are more comprehensive in scope 
than self-imposed codes of conduct. Soft law may also serve as a stepping-
stone toward more concrete legal obligations or hard law.81  
 
Being “only” soft law, the question of interest is whether these voluntary 
measures really can influence the behavior of MNE´s, or if they only pose 
as a wolf in sheep´s clothing? 
 
5.2 The UN Global Compact 
In an attempt to promote greater corporate accountability for human rights 
violations the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed in 1999 the 
Global Compact, which is a voluntary initiative that requires companies to 
                                                
81 Grover, Anand and others, Pharmaceutical Companies and Global lack of Access to 
Medicines: Strengthening Accountability under the Right to Health, Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics (2012) p. 241 
 36 
commit themselves to ten principles relating to human rights, protection of 
the environment and labor law. The Secretary-General initiated the initiative 
in an attempt to codify CSR. According to the two human right principles, 
businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights and make sure that they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses.  
 
It is a simple procedure to become a member of the Global Compact, which 
has led to approximately 7,000 businesses being currently members of the 
Compact. The Global Compact has generated a lot of criticism mostly from 
NGOs claiming that the UN´s positive image is made vulnerable to being 
sullied by corporate criminals, while companies get a chance to “blue-wash” 
their image by wrapping themselves in the flag of the UN.82 The Compact 
does not have a method of enforcement and the only penalty for a 
corporation not abiding the ten principles is simply exclusion from the 
Compact.  
 
However, the Global Compact was never intended to be a regulatory 
arrangement, even less a legally binding code of conduct. The critics 
therefore wish it to be something that it is not, since the Global Compact 
never claimed to be anything else than a learning platform intended to 
promote good practice. 
 
5.3  Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework  
Globalization has contributed to the increasingly central role of MNEs in 
domestic and international economic orders. The world´s 300 largest 
companies account for 25% of the world´s total productive assets. MNEs 
also hold 90% of all technology and products patents worldwide and are 
involved in 70% of world trade. These companies have therefore greater 
economic power over markets than do states in the international trade era.83 
In some instances, the profits of large MNEs have outgrown the GDP of 
many states. For instance, in 2010 the revenues of Pfizer, the world’s largest 
pharmaceutical company, were larger than the GDP of approximately two-
thirds of the countries in the world.84 
 
It is quite apparent that the nature and scope of pharmaceutical companies´ 
human rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines are not 
crystal clear. However, it has been confirmed by the CESCR that the private 
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business sector has in fact responsibilities regarding the realization of the 
right to health, but it has not taken any further steps to specify these 
responsibilities. In an attempt to do so, the UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, John Ruggie, developed a policy framework for business 
and human rights, and called it the “Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework”. 
 
The Framework rests on differentiated but complementary responsibilities 
and comprises three core principles, namely: the State duty to protect 
against human rights abuses by third parties, including businesses; the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for more 
effective access to remedy.85The second pillar is the corporate responsibility 
to respect, and essentially it clarifies that the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights means that corporations should avoid infringing on the 
human rights of others, to put it simply: to do no harm.86 
 
A company has to become aware of, prevent and address human rights 
impact and it can do so through four steps: adopt a human rights policy; 
conduct human rights impact assessment; integrate human rights policies 
throughout the company; and track performance. Essentially it means that 
the company has to perform a due diligence throughout the entire life of the 
project in order to acquire knowledge about human rights impacts and to act 
upon that information. According to the Framework, MNEs should address 
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.87 
 
5.4 The Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies  
 
Whereas the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework and the UN Global 
Compact are general human rights standards for all business entities, the 
Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to 
access to medicines88 drafted by former UN Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt, 
identify with greater care the responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies 
in relation to access to medicines.89  
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The human rights responsibilities for pharmaceutical companies are of 
course not identical to those obligations of states, such a duty cannot fall 
upon a private entity. Nonetheless, the Guidelines provide a useful tool for 
clarifying the right-to-health responsibilities of corporations.90 The aim of 
the Guidelines is to provide practical, constructive and specific guidance to 
pharmaceutical companies and other interested parties. The language used 
throughout the Guidelines is deliberately set to “should” instead of “must” 
in order to avoid the controversial doctrinal question “Are businesses legally 
bound by international human rights law?”  
 
While the Guidelines recognize that companies have a responsibility to 
enhance shareholder value, it states that companies also have a human rights 
responsibility to extend access to medicines for all, even to the 
disadvantaged poor people. In this context, pricing has a critical role to play. 
According to the Guidelines, lower prices do not necessarily mean lower 
profits. Sometime the goal to enhancing access to medicines coincides with 
commercial interests. For instance, there are numerous arrangements that 
may reduce prices and increase sales, and since the lives and health of 
millions are at stake, companies must approach such arrangements with 
urgency and boldness.91Pharmaceutical companies are therefore required to 
do all they reasonably can to ensure that medicines are available in 
sufficient quantities in the countries where they are needed. They can 
therefore not arbitrarily withhold supply of medicines over which they have 
a patent, or manufacture, from a particular country or group of people.  
 
In order to combat neglected diseases, the Guidelines require that a 
company should make a public commitment to contribute R&D for these 
kinds of diseases. The company should also either provide in-house R&D or 
support external R&D for neglected diseases. In addition, the company 
should consult with the WHO and other relevant organizations with the aim 
of enhancing its contribution to R&D for neglected diseases. Since R&D 
has given insufficient attention to neglected diseases, it is important to 
provide an incentive for companies to invest R&D, in order for the IP 
regime to make a major contribution to the discovery of new medicines and 
to potentially save lives. In that context the Guidelines demand that all 
companies provide in-house R&D for neglected diseases, since the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health not only requires that existing 
medicines are accessible, but also that essential new medicines are 
developed as soon as possible.92 
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A pharmaceutical company that develops a life-saving medicine places an 
important responsibility on the patent-holder, due to its critical social 
function. Having developed a life-saving medicine, the company has an 
additional human rights responsibility to take all reasonable steps to make 
the medicine as accessible as possible, as soon as possible, to all those in 
need. Patent-holding pharmaceutical companies have a responsibility to 
ensure that their policies and practices do not negatively impact access to 
life-saving medicines. According to the Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework a company is required to “avoid infringing on the human rights 
of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they 
are involved”. In order to meet this responsibility, companies should place 
policies and processes, including a policy commitment to meet their 
responsibility to respect human rights, human rights due diligence, and a 
process to enable the “remediation” of any adverse human rights impact 
they cause to which they contribute. This responsibility applies to patent- 
holding pharmaceutical companies.93 
 
The conclusion of the Special Rapporteur is that the status of innovator 
companies would be immensely enhanced if they would not treat their 
patents as their “crown jewels”, but instead choose to publicly recognize 
their critically important social function and right- to-health responsibilities. 
They must prevent or address negative impacts of their pricing and licensing 
policies on access to medicines, and must do everything possible within 
their sphere of influence to fulfill their human rights responsibilities. 
Presently, this is not happening.94 
 
5.5 Concluding Comments 
One must not neglect the importance of soft law in an area of law where 
legally binding acts remain unavailable. Just because soft law is not legally 
enforceable, does not mean that they do not have any legal importance. The 
Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework presented by UN Special 
Representative John Ruggie rely on soft law to draw its legitimacy for the 
responsibility to respect doctrine. Both the OECD Guidelines and the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration states that companies should respect the human rights 
of those affected by their activities. Essentially, the Special Representative 
implies that the responsibility to respect as stated in the Framework, has 
acquired a near-universal recognition and has been with us long enough to 
be accepted as legitimate.95Although unanimously endorsed by the UN 
when presented in 2008, the Framework received its share of criticism; 
especially from NGOs claiming that the Framework is silent on the point of 
accountability and that is has no legal effect. However, the Framework 
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deliberately kept the language to “should” in order not to make the same 
mistake as the predecessor UN Norms96, which failed miserably since it 
placed the same responsibility on MNEs as on states.   
 
Unfortunately, the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies 
suffer from the same weakness as both self-imposed codes of conducts and 
external voluntary mechanisms as they do not go far enough towards 
establishing any direct legal obligations for pharmaceutical companies under 
the right to health. The preamble of the Guidelines refers to the Special 
Representative´s work and establishes that the “private business sector has 
human rights responsibilities” which is further refined in the text paragraph 
which states that “pharmaceutical companies, including innovator, generic 
and biotechnology companies have human rights responsibilities in relation 
to access to medicines”. The nature and extent of theses responsibilities, 
however, is not clearly defined.  
 
However, the Guidelines and Framework do represent an important 
contribution to the development of soft law addressing access to medicines 
under the right to health. Also, they provide a useful tool for clarifying the 
right-to-health responsibilities of corporations. But unfortunately, even if all 
the guidelines were to be adopted by pharmaceutical companies, they would 
simply take the form of self-imposed codes of conduct. Therefore, in a way, 
voluntary measures can be perceived as a wolf in sheep´s clothing, since 
they portray an image of binding regulatory acts, but when it comes to 
establishing an effective accountability mechanism by which to regulate the 
behavior of pharmaceutical companies, they fall short.   
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August 26, 2003. 
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6.  Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
6.1 Sources of CSR 
Self-imposed codes of conduct, including CSR initiatives, declaration 
principles, human rights guidelines and other voluntary mechanisms have 
all emerged to address the human rights impact of MNEs and the 
corresponding lack of accountability. As a result of external pressure, 
mainly from costumers and civil society, MNEs have adopted a set of CSR 
measures meant to address human rights issues. Many of these measures fall 
under the umbrella of CSR movement, which can be broadly defined as 
“any attempt to get corporations to behave responsibly on a voluntary basis 
out of ethical or bottom-line considerations”.97 
 
The sources of CSR cannot be drawn from international or national law, 
inspiration is instead drawn from guidelines and frameworks that promote 
good practice. The most notable sources of CSR comes from the OECD – 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises that flesh out MNEs 
responsibility to “respect the human rights of those affected by their 
activities consistent with the host government´s international obligations 
and commitments”. The already mentioned Respect, Protect and Remedy 
Framework and the elaborate Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Companies are of course of great value for CSR inspiration. Other 
institutions are the ILOs Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. In addition to international 
institutions, MNEs have adopted their own code of conduct since they have 
an economic interest of bringing their practice into conformity with at least 
some essential human rights standards.98 
 
6.2 The “Nice to have´s” 
The role of a pharmaceutical company in a global economy is to make 
research, develop, and produce innovative medicines that make a difference 
to sick people´s quality of life and it is their duty to do so in a profitable 
way. No other societal actor assumes this responsibility. Many 
pharmaceutical corporations, however, perceive a moral obligation to do 
more, whenever possible, to help alleviate health problems of poor people 
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all over the globe. Such corporate actions are, however, of a voluntary 
nature and should remain so. The discrepancies between public expectations 
and the financial market-driven objectives of businesses have resulted in a 
“legitimacy gap” and a hostile attitude towards MNEs in general. To help 
establish priorities on any potential obligations with regards to human rights 
and corporate responsibilities in general, a hierarchy of responsibilities can 
be helpful.99 
 
The following figure is intended to illustrate systematic analysis of 
corporate responsibility in regards to access to medicines.  
 
Figure 1: Leisinger´s hierarchy pyramid of corporate responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 
The model distinguishes between three degrees of corporate obligations. In 
the “must” dimension, there are the non-negotiable mandatory regulations 
on the respective industry. In the “ought” dimension, there are the good 
corporate responsibility standards which are particularly relevant in 
sensitive business areas or in countries where the qualities of law is 
insufficient or inadequately enforced. Finally in the “can” dimension, there 
are the voluntary measures of additional responsibility according to 
capacity.100  
 
As for the “must” dimension, a fulfillment of a pharmaceutical company´s 
core responsibility is required and must be done in a legitimate way, that is, 
in compliance with all laws and regulations concerning healthy workplaces, 
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environmental protection and the safety and efficiency of products and 
services. Also making part of the ‘‘must’’-dimension is the obligation to 
adhere to ethical principles and transparency concerning clinical trials, as 
laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki101 and in the WHO Guidelines for 
good clinical practice for trials on pharmaceutical products.102 
 
The “ought” to dimension is of particular importance where the quality of 
local legal norms is insufficient, then companies ought to apply higher 
standards such as fair labor conditions and wages that allow employees to 
lead a decent life and cover their basic needs. Leading pharmaceutical 
companies have established for their employees a comprehensive program 
of medical services that include free or heavily subsidized facilities for 
diagnosis or treatment and psychosocial care of workers with HIV/AIDS or 
other neglected diseases. Other actions for workers include free or heavily 
subsidized meals, nursery schools for single mothers, free training 
opportunities using company infrastructure and scholarships programs for 
the children of low-income employees. In regards to prices for life-saving 
medicines, responsible pharmaceutical companies are willing to adjust the 
price, on a case-by-case basis, for patients living in individual or collective 
poverty. Finally, most pharmaceutical companies provide donations in cases 
of acute emergency, for example the 2004 tsunami. This leads to the “can” 
dimension of corporate endeavors to protect, respect and fulfill the right to 
health.103    
 
Business services in the “can” dimension mainly involves corporate 
philanthropy, as stated in figure 1, but can in modern terms of today be 
called CSR. They are defined as those expenditures beyond a company´s 
business activity and have no direct corporate advantages or any financially 
measurable reward. Corporate philanthropy, or CSR, belongs to the 
discretionary business responsibilities, which are purely voluntary guided 
only by business´ desire to engage in social activities that are not required 
by law. It is therefore simply something that is “nice to have” for a 
company, since it may have many benefits, but is far from compulsory.  
 
6.2.1  A Portfolio of Good Practice  
If a pharmaceutical company would be dedicated to the cause of improving 
access to medicines for people living in developing countries within their 
sphere of corporate philanthropy, there is a body of good practices in which 
pharmaceutical companies can adopt. It includes the following steps: 
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• Differential pricing to reduce tenders for selected drugs against 
poverty-related and neglected diseases for use in least- developed 
countries, particularly for drugs which are patent protected or 
exclusive.   
• Donations for disease abolition programs or emergencies, adhering 
to WHO Guidelines for Drug Donations.  
• R&D investments for neglected diseases.  
• Support for broader health and development goals in developing 
countries.  
• Works with stakeholders in countries where they operate to ensure 
that access to medicines initiatives are integrated correctly. 
• Exploring opportunities for production in developing countries 
through wholly- owned subsidiaries and the use of voluntary licenses 
in order to increase sustainable access to essential medicines.104 
This set of body would definitely elevate the company into corporate 
responsibility excellence, and place the company in the top of the pyramid 
of corporate responsibilities.  
 
6.3 Can the Fox Guard the Henhouse? 
It is easy to forget that a corporation is an artificial person, a legal creation, 
and cannot in itself be said to have any social responsibilities. The 
individuals who are to be responsible are businessmen, which means in-
dividual proprietors or corporate executives. A corporate executive can of 
course be either male or female, but for the sake of linguistic simplicity the 
term “he” and “his” will be used.  
 
A corporate executive has a direct responsibility towards his employers. 
That responsibility is to conduct business in a way that is in conformity with 
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible, 
while conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law 
and in ethical custom. To say that a corporate executive has a “social 
responsibility” in his capacity of a businessman is to say that he is to act in 
some way that is not in the interest of his employers. For instance, if he 
would to refrain from increasing price of the product in order to contribute 
to the social objective of preventing inflation, even though an increase of 
price would benefit the shareholders. Or if he would to spend money on 
reducing pollution, or another given cause, beyond the amount that is the 
best interest of the corporation, or if he would hire unemployed personnel 
instead of better qualified available employers to contributing to the social 
objective of reducing poverty. In each of these cases, the corporate 
executive would be spending someone else´s money for a general social 
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interest. If his actions due to the “social responsibility” reduce returns to 
stockholders, he is spending their money. If his actions raise the price to 
customers, he is spending the customers' money. And finally if his actions 
lower the wages of some employees, he is spending their money.105 
 
Adopting CSR measures within a company´s business conduct is not cheap. 
It requires a set of self-monitor, transparency and various donation 
programs. These expenditures go beyond what is necessary for the 
corporation, and can be seen as a cost without any return in monetary value. 
In addition, allowing a corporation to monitor itself and expecting it to 
penalize itself if found guilty to a human rights abuse, is an excellent 
example of allowing the fox to guard the henhouse.  
 
6.4 Concluding Comments 
CSR is characterized by its voluntarism and lack of legal enforceability. 
Therefore, a corporation cannot be held responsible for not realizing basic 
human rights; this is once again the duty of states. CSR also fails to provide 
remedies for the affected individuals and groups, as required under 
international human rights law. 
 
CSR is a perfect example of allowing the fox to guard the henhouse. 
Corporations are not required to adopt a code of conduct and as a result 
many corporations do not have codes at all. In addition, if adopted CSR 
measured would prove to be successful in highlighting bad corporate 
behavior, the corporate accountability would unlikely have any significant 
effects due to the unavailability of any external accountability mechanisms. 
Thus, CSR suffers from the same weaknesses as soft law and other 
voluntary mechanisms, namely; there is no organ of control, hence no 
accountability.  
 
However, CSR should not be viewed in such a narrow perspective. CSR can 
have very positive effects on a corporation. CSR measures can lead to 
improved goodwill, attract better and more qualified employees as well as 
attract new investors. Today, it is evident that the pharmaceutical industry is 
taking the matter of CSR very seriously. This is mainly because if CSR is 
not at the centre of the company´s operations, there is a fundamental risk to 
the business. Within the pharmaceutical industry these risks range from the 
medical profession refusing to prescribe drugs, potential investors deciding 
not to invest or current investors selling their shares. Any of these issues can 
lead to negative media coverage, and seeing that the pharmaceutical 
industry is already suffering from a bad reputation, it is very important for 
them to try to maintain a good image.106Therefore, CSR is a very strong 
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influence for the behaviour of pharmaceutical companies and can improve 
the access of medicines in a meaningful way. The different donation 
schemes and medical aid for employees that most pharmaceutical 
companies offer, as shown in the “ought to” dimension, illustrates the fact 
that pharmaceutical companies are in fact aware of their responsibilities and 
provide for basic human rights, even though they are not obliged to.  
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7. How to Move Forward 
 
There are many fundamental obstacles to the improvement of access to 
medicines for the world´s poor. The most obvious ones are absolute poverty, 
lack of good governance leading to deficits in health infrastructure, lack of 
well-trained doctors, nurses and pharmacists. These obstacles have for some 
reason been placed in the backseat and focus has instead shifted to blaming 
the pharmaceutical industry. They now face pressure and demands to 
denounce their IP rights, to make the latest patented medicines available at 
lower prices, or even free of charge, and criticism for the market-oriented 
R&D have become a new trend. This new approach can result in costly 
interferences for the pharmaceutical industry, without even solving the 
market failure. In order to move forward and overcome the challenge of the 
market failure, focus must be re-shifted towards the systemic deficits and 
political inadequacies that lie at the root of the access to medicines issue. 
My belief is that a long-term solution on better access to medicines for the 
poor should not simply consist of demands on corporate property. Instead, 
new and innovative solutions must be encouraged, measures to improve 
incentives for pharmaceutical R&D must be adopted and methods of public 
funding should be applied.  
 
I also believe that IP protection is a precondition for successful R&D, 
patents are therefore not up for negotiation in the access to medicines 
debate. Patents contribute to meet the needs of future patients and helps to 
find new solutions and cures for health needs, they are also crucial for 
securing future business existence for research oriented companies. 
Therefore, the solution for the lack of incentive for neglected diseases lies 
not in the abolition of the patent system, but in an intelligent mix of public 
and private research. The corporate responsibility challenge is therefore to 
find innovative and creative channels for the responsible use of patents 
under the conditions of market failure.  
The Guidelines formulated by the former Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, on 
the right to health is incomplete, yet it provides a normative foundation 
upon which could be built a more comprehensive set of binding legal 
obligations for pharmaceutical companies under the right to health in 
relation to access to medicines. Presumably, as long as there is no legally 
binding instrument, the right to health and access to medicines will not be 
improved, since self-imposed codes of conduct and voluntary guidelines 
have yet been incapable of improving access to medicines under the right to 
health. Voluntary mechanisms and CSR have for a long time aspired to 
improve access to medicines for the world´s poor, but has yet failed to do so 
in a significant way, since millions of people still die every year due to the 
neglect of the developed world. CSR measures such as donation programs 
and discounts are unquestionably good, but can however be terminated for 
numerous reasons and unexpectedly.  Therefore, innovative and stable 
methods are not only necessary, but also essential for the well being of all 
peoples. 
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